REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

To the Management of Internet Security Research Group (ISRG):

We have examined ISRG management's assertion that for its Certification Authority (CA) operations at its Salt Lake City, Utah, USA, and Centennial, Colorado, USA locations, for the program known as Let's Encrypt throughout the period September 1, 2020, to August 31, 2021, for its root and subordinate CA certificates as listed in Appendix A, ISRG has:

- Disclosed its SSL certificate lifecycle management business practices in its:

    - Certification Practice Statement (v4.1); and

    - Certificate Policy (v3.1)

    including its commitment to provide SSL Certificates in conformity with the CA/Browser Forum Requirements on the ISRG website, and provided such services in accordance with its disclosed practices;

- Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:

    - The integrity of keys and SSL certificates it manages is established and protected throughout their lifecycles; and

    - SSL subscriber information is properly authenticated (for the registration activities performed by ISRG);

- Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that:

    - Logical and physical access to CA systems and data is restricted to authorized individuals;

    - The continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and

    - CA systems development, maintenance, and operations are properly authorized and performed to maintain CA systems integrity; and

- Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that it meets the Network and Certificate System Security Requirements as set forth by the CA/Browser Forum

based on the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – SSL Baseline with Network Security – Version 2.4.1.

ISRG's management is responsible for its assertion. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion based on our examination.

The relative effectiveness and significance of specific controls at ISRG and their effect on assessments of control risk for subscribers and relying parties are dependent on their interaction with the controls and other factors present at individual subscriber and relying party locations. Our examination did not extend to controls at individual subscriber and relying party locations and we have not evaluated the effectiveness of such controls.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Those standards require that we plan and perform the examination to obtain reasonable assurance about whether management's assertion is fairly stated, in all material respects. An examination involves performing procedures to obtain evidence about management's assertion. The nature, timing, and extent of the procedures selected depend on our judgment, including an assessment of the risks of material misstatement of management's assertion, whether due to fraud or error. We believe that the evidence we obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.

Because of the nature and inherent limitations of controls, ISRG's ability to meet the aforementioned criteria may be affected. For example, controls may not prevent, or detect and correct, error, fraud, unauthorized access to systems and information, or failure to comply with internal and external policies or requirements. Also, the projection

of any conclusions based on our findings to future periods is subject to the risk that changes may alter the validity of such conclusions.

In our opinion management's assertion, as referred to above, is fairly stated, in all material respects.

Emphasis of Matters

ISRG has disclosed that during the period September 1, 2020, to August 31, 2021, the following incidents were identified and disclosed to the Web PKI community as follows:

- Mozilla Bug ID 1666047: On September 8, 2020, ISRG was made aware that that the CA served OCSP responses older than three and one half (3.5) days for 268 certificate serial numbers. From September 12, 2020, ISRG served OCSP responses older than three and one half (3.5) days for an additional 34 certificate serial numbers. None of the OCSP responses were served beyond their validity period. The maximum age an OCSP response ever reached was five (5) days. For OCSP responses with a seven (7)-day validity period, the Microsoft Root Program specifies that updated responses be available within three and one half (3.5) days and the CA/B Forum Baseline Requirements specify four (4) days. ISRG was notified of the problem by an alert on elevated error-level logs. ISRG found that the errors were caused by a recent change to their RPC system that, in a certain error case, caused a particular column in its certificate status table to have a value of "0" for a specific empty field rather than either the expected value or NULL. ISRG collected serials and last-update timestamp information for affected entries and enacted a temporary manual plan for continued remediation of these entries. A Boulder CA software release was deployed to production on September 10, 2020, ensuring no future erroneous values would be added to the database.

- Mozilla Bug ID 1684112: On December 22, 2020, during a quarterly review of the CA/B Forum baseline requirements, ISRG noticed that it was were not compliant with section 5.4.1.2.5. Let's Encrypt logs an audit log event when OCSP is signed upon initial certificate issuance. Subsequent updates to the OCSP response throughout a certificate's 90-day lifetime are not logged as audit log events. The CA/B Forum Baseline Requirements section 5.4.1.2.5 requires these events be logged as an audit level event and stored for a period of time. Revocation logs are properly logged as audit logs and not affected by this incident. ISRG implemented a fix to their Boulder CA Software to implement the logging on January 31, 2021.

- Mozilla Bug IDs 1715455 and 1715672: On June 8, 2021, ISRG was made aware that it was issuing certificates that were valid for 90 days plus one (1) second. ISRG historically issued certificates valid for 90 days by taking the issuance time and adding exactly 2,160 hours to yield the certificate's "not after" date; however, RFC 5280 defines the validity period of a certificate as being the duration between the "not before" and "not after" timestamps, inclusive. This inclusivity means that the certificates were issued as being valid for 90 days plus one (1) second as described above. ISRG issued an update to the CA Boulder Software to fix the issue so that all future certificates issued were valid for 90 days. ISRG determined that revoking the affected certificates would not benefit the Web PKI and CA ecosystem and failing to revoke certificates within a specific timeframe would be a violation of the Baseline Requirements and its own CP/CPS.

During our assessment, Schellman performed testing of certificate issuance, on a sample basis, and noted that there were no certificate deficiencies identified in any of the samples tested. As a result, our opinion is not modified with respect to these matters.

This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ISRG's services other than its CA operations at its Salt Lake City, Utah, USA, and Centennial, Colorado, USA, locations, nor the suitability of any of ISRG's services for any customer's intended purpose.

ISRG's use of the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – SSL Baseline with Network Security Seal constitutes a symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be construed, to update this report or provide any additional assurance.

Schellman & Company, LLC

Schellman & Company, LLC
Certified Public Accountants
4010 W Boy Scout Blvd, Suite 600
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October 14, 2021

**ASSERTION OF MANAGEMENT AS TO ITS DISCLOSURE OF ITS PRACTICES
AND ITS CONTROLS OVER ITS SSL CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY OPERATIONS
DURING THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 1, 2020, TO AUGUST 31, 2021**

Internet Security Research Group (ISRG) operates the Certification Authority (CA) services known as Let's Encrypt for its root and subordinate CA certificates as listed in Appendix A and provides SSL CA services.

ISRG management has assessed its controls over its Let's Encrypt SSL CA services. Based on that assessment, in providing its SSL Certification Authority (CA) services at its Salt Lake City, Utah, USA, and Centennial, Colorado, USA, locations throughout the period September 1, 2020, to August 31, 2021, ISRG has:

- Disclosed its SSL certificate lifecycle management business practices in its:

  - Certification Practice Statement (v4.1); and

  - Certificate Policy (v3.1)

  including its commitment to provide SSL Certificates in conformity with the CA/Browser Forum Requirements on the ISRG website, and provided such services in accordance with its disclosed practices;

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  - Logical and physical access to CA systems and data is restricted to authorized individuals;

  - The continuity of key and certificate management operations is maintained; and

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- Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that it meets the Network and Certificate System Security Requirements as set forth by the CA/Browser Forum

based on the WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – SSL Baseline with Network Security – Version 2.4.1.

During the assessment, ISRG disclosed that during the period September 1, 2020, to August 31, 2021, the following incidents were identified and disclosed to the Web PKI community as follows:

- Mozilla Bug ID 1666047: On September 8, 2020, ISRG was made aware that that the CA served OCSP responses older than three and one half (3.5) days for 268 certificate serial numbers. From September 12, 2020, ISRG served OCSP responses older than three and one half (3.5) days for an additional 34 certificate serial numbers. None of the OCSP responses were served beyond their validity period. The maximum age an OCSP response ever reached was five (5) days. For OCSP responses with a seven (7)-day validity period, the Microsoft Root Program specifies that updated responses be available within three and one half (3.5) days and the CA/B Forum Baseline Requirements specify four (4) days. ISRG was notified of the problem by an alert on elevated error-level logs. ISRG found that the errors were caused by a recent change to their RPC system that, in a certain error case, caused a particular column in its certificate status table to have a value of "0" for a specific empty field rather than either the expected value or NULL. ISRG collected serials and last-update timestamp information for affected entries and enacted a temporary manual plan for continued remediation of these entries. A Boulder CA software release was deployed to production on September 10, 2020, ensuring no future erroneous values would be added to the database.

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Incidents not relevant to the assessed criteria are included in Appendix B.

Joshua Aas
Executive Director
Internet Security Research Group
October 14, 2021

APPENDIX A – ISRG ROOT AND ISSUING CAs

Distinguished Name	Certificate SHA-256 Fingerprint
Subject: C = US, O = Internet Security Research Group, CN = ISRG Root X1	96BCEC06264976F37460779ACF28C5A7CFE8A3C0AAE11A8FFCEE05C0BDDF08C6
Subject: C = US, O = Internet Security Research Group, CN = ISRG Root X2	69729B8E15A86EFC177A57AFB7171DFC64ADD28C2FCA8CF1507E34453CCB1470
Subject: C = US, O = Internet Security Research Group, CN = ISRG Root X2	8B05B68CC659E5ED0FCB38F2C942FBFD200E6F2FF9F85D63C6994EF5E0B02701
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = Let's Encrypt Authority X3*	731D3D9CFAA061487A1D71445A42F67DF0AFCA2A6C2D2F98FF7B3CE112B1F568
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = Let's Encrypt Authority X4	5DE9152BED31FA0515DD1FC746133F1327562EF72A84CF2D2403E748A604D0D4
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R3	67ADD1166B020AE61B8F5FC96813C04C2AA589960796865572A3C7E737613DFD
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R4	1A07529A8B3F01D231DFAD2ABDF71899200BB65CD7E03C59FA82272533355B74
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = E1	46494E30379059DF18BE52124305E606FC59070E5B21076CE113954B60517CDA
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = E2	BACDE0463053CE1D62F8BE74370BBAE79D4FCAF19FC07643AEF195E6A59BD578

The following certificates were signed by IdenTrust for ISRG.

Distinguished Name	Certificate SHA-256 Fingerprint
Subject: C = US, O = Internet Security Research Group, CN = ISRG Root X1	6D99FB265EB1C5B3744765FCBC648F3CD8E1BFFAFDC4C2F99B9D47CF7FF1C24F
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = Let's Encrypt Authority X1	7FDCE3BF4103C2684B3ADBB5792884BD45C75094C217788863950346F79C90A3
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = Let's Encrypt Authority X1	23D29B9707396BCCA317F9EF1B1E6A626C4E481283CD85F74A516FF6CAB997ED
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = Let's Encrypt Authority X2	EC0C6CA496A67A13342FEC5221F68D4B3E53B1BC22F6E4BCCC9C68F0415CDEA4
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = Let's Encrypt Authority X2	2F45659D64DC74CCEC9E2A4290715828F95FA8CC7A6C8800D3968F14DFCF1DB7
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = Let's Encrypt Authority X3	25847D668EB4F04FDD40B12B6B0740C567DA7D024308EB6C2C96FE41D9DE218D

Distinguished Name	Certificate SHA-256 Fingerprint
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = Let's Encrypt Authority X4	A74B0C32B65B95FE2C4F8F098947A68B695033BED0B51DD8B984ECAE89571BB6
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R3	FEE765DA4CACF53C71AF202F89F3612420FD930D804E204FEEEFC9D78084BB7B
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R3	730C1BDCD85F57CE5DC0BBA733E5F1BA5A925B2A771D640A26F7A454224DAD3B
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R4	8E510575F07A97D5FADA3BFDA6187E03E77D3392318457EA8718A9D28B43396B
Subject: C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R4	5A8F16FDA448D783481CCA57A2428D174DAD8C60943CEB28F661AE31FD39A5FA

APPENDIX B– OTHER INCIDENTS DISCLOSED BY ISRG

The following incident(s) occurred prior to the audit period and disclosed because the associated Mozilla Bugzilla ticket was open at some point during the audit period.

Mozilla Bugzilla ID	Date	Title
1619047	2020.02.28	CAA Rechecking bug